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THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE'S 
PROPOSED BAN: A NEW APPROACH TO 
PERSONAL WATERCRAFr USE IN THE 
NATIONAL PARKS 
KAREN D' ANrUONO* 
Personal watercraft, with their capacity for high speed and easy ma-
neuverability, generate considerable safety and environmental c0n-
cerns at the nationa4 state, and local leve/.<;. These vesse~, more 
commonly known as jet skis and waverunners, are currently present 
in thirty-two of the eighty-seven units of the National Park System 
that allow motmized boating. Responding to high accident rates as 
weU as to harms caused to aquatic wildlife and vegetation Uy the ves-
se~, the National Park Service proposed a general ban on personal 
watercraft within units of the National Park System. The proposed 
ban is the first comprehensive solution to personal watercraft use on 
the national level. It is expected to be finalized sometime in the year 
2000. This Comment suggests that such a ban is both legal and ~ 
sir able. It a~o suggests that exemptions from the ban should be 
granted on a very limited basis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Personal watercraft (PWC), more commonly known as jet skis 
and waverunners, are increasingly common sights at National Park 
System units (System units) which accommodate motorized boating.1 
Considering that there are currently more than one million PWC in 
operation with estimated sales of 250,000 vessels a year, this increase is 
not surprising.! 
Concurrent with the increase in PWC use in national parks is the 
rising number of visitors to System units, leading to inevitable 
* Articles Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON COlLEGE ENVIRONMENTALMFAIRS LAw REVIEW. 
1 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 49,313 
(1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15,1998). 
t See Jack Sullivan, Commotion on the Ocean, LoJces and Rivers - Jet Skiers Are Making Waves, 
BoSTON HERALD, Aug. 2, 1998, at 19. 
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conflicts over competing uses.3 In addition, environmentalists and 
members of the public continue to voice concerns about potentially 
severe safety and environmental problems caused by PWC.4 Among 
the most frequently cited environmental problems are damage to 
shallow-water aquatic vegetation, wildlife "flight" caused by noise 
emitted by the vehicles, and water pollution due to the discharge of 
oil and gas mixtures from PWC engines.5 
In response to these conflicts and concerns, the National Park 
Service (NPS)--the federal agency charged with managing the Na-
tional Park System (System)--proposed a general ban on PWC use in 
System units on September 15, 1998.6 According to the proposed 
rule, PWC will be banned from most System units.7 In those units, 
NPS could only authorize PWC use on a unit-by-unit basis by passing 
special regulations which appear in the Federal Register.8 Thirteen 
System units would be permitted to forego this Federal Register rule-
making and utilize more locally-based procedures to authorize PWC 
use.9 While the PWC industry and PWC users criticize the proposed 
rule as overprotective and beyond the authority of NPS, environmen-
talists and other members of the public applaud the agency's efforts.10 
As of the date of publication of this Comment, the proposed rule had 
not yet been finalized, but final approval is expected sometime in the 
year 2000.11 
3 See Lindsey Kate Shaw, Comment, Land Use Planning at the National Parks: Canyonlands 
National Park and Off-&ad Vehicles, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 795, 795 & n.5 (1997) (comparing 
37 million visitors in 1950 to 52 million visitors in 1990, and estimating 500 million visitors 
in 2010). 
4 See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314-49,315; John Carey, Those #1*&#1 jet Skis IWar up the 
Potomac, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1998, at 56. 
5 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314. 
6 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314. 
7 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313-49,314. 
8 See id. at 49,313. 
9 See id. An additional twelve units will be able to use the locally-based procedures for 
two years after the proposed rule is finalized. See id. The thirteen units discussed in the text 
are allowed to continue PWC use for two years following final rule publication. See id. 
10 See, e.g., Susan Sward & Jim Doyle, jet Ski Ban Sought for Golden Gate Rec Area; Ocean 
Environmentalists in S.R Delighted by Plan, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 1998, at A22; Garvey 
Winegar, National Park Service May Put jet Skiers in Deep Water, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, 
Sept. 23,1998, at E-3;John Donaldson, Personal Watercraft Industry Association, National 
Park Service Has Gone Too Far (visited Jan. 2, 1999) <http:www.pwia.org/Hot_NPS.-
htm#anchor 1458443> [hereinafter National Park Service Has Gone Too Far] . 
11 See Chip Davis, National Park Service, Personal Watercraft Use to Be Regulated in the 
Parks (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.aqd.nps.gov/pubs/yir/yir98/chapterOl/-
chapterOl pg3.html>. 
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This Comment examines the legality and desirability of the NPS 
System-wide ban on PWC use. Section I outlines the management 
authority of NPS, including its balancing of competing visitor uses, its 
reconciliation of dual statutory mandates, and the interaction be-
tween the National Park Service Act of 1916 (Organic Act) and indi-
vidual System units' enabling legislation. Section II provides a brief 
overview of PWC characteristics and their effects. Section III summa-
rizes the current status of PWC law, primarily at the federal level. Sec-
tion IV discusses the proposed rule in more detail by highlighting its 
text and NPS's stated reasoning for its provisions. 
Section V suggests that the NPS System-wide ban is both legal and 
desirable because it is a reasonable statutory interpretation of the Or-
ganic Act. Section V also recommends that NPS use extreme caution 
in foregoing Federal Register rulemakings in the case of the thirteen 
exempted units in the proposed rule. 
I. THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM 
A The National Park Service Act of 1916 and Subsequent Amendments 
NPS manages the more than 370 System units, ranging from 
parks to recreation areas to seashores, that currently comprise the Sys-
tem.I2 The System is the largest, most complex, and most specific sys-
tem of government preserves in the world.13 In 1916, Congress passed 
the Organic Act and created NPS within the Department of the Inte-
rior to: 
promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as 
national parks ... by such means and measures as conform 
to the fundamental purpose of the said parks ... which pur-
pose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wildlife therein to provide for the enjoyment 
12 See National Park Service, Designation of National Park System Units (visited Jan. 2, 
1999) <http://www.nps.gov /legacy /nomenclature.html> [hereinafter Designation]. There 
are numerous designations within the National Park System, many of which describe the 
use and/or purpose of a particular unit. See id. For example, a "national park" usually re-
fers to large natural places having a wide variety of attributes, including historic assets, 
while a Mnational recreation area" may emphasize water-based recreation or function as an 
urban park that combines scarce open spaces with the preservation of significant historic 
resources to provide outdoor recreation for large numbers of people. See id. 
15 See Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: '~ Contradictory Mandate?'~ 
74 DENY. U.L. REv. 575, 575-76 (1997). 
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of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.I4 
Historical accounts of the Organic Act point to a myriad of ex-
planations for the creation of NPS, including the desire on the part of 
the railroad industry to preserve magnificent scenery along their 
routes.I5 The railroad industry intended the preservation to promote 
tourism and to prevent haphazard development and other invasive 
commercial uses that could discourage the American public from 
traveling to these majestic areas.I6 In addition to profit motives, the 
possibility of using park units to teach the public about nature, geol-
ogy, fossils, or sedimentation also motivated the creation of NPS.I7 
Regardless of the exact motivation for the System, rhetoric urging its 
development painted national parks as the "nation's playgrounds" or 
"nature's cathedrals," capable of instilling patriotism in the American 
public. IS 
In what would be the beginning of an ongoing debate about 
whether the fundamental purpose of national parks was "preserva-
tion" or "use," Franklin Lane, Secretary of the Interior in 1918, inter-
preted the Organic Act's language as charging NPS with a dual man-
date.I9 Under that mandate, NPS was to maintain the national parks 
in an "absolutely" unimpaired form for future generations while si-
multaneously providing the public with opportunities to enjoy the 
parks through individual pursuits.20 
Congress authorized NPS to fulfill its dual mandate through rules 
and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.21 NPS's 
14 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Prior to the successful passage of the Organic Act in 1916, 
Congress struggled for six years to establish some type of bureau to efficiently administer 
the eleven national parks then in existence and to enable the American public to experi-
ence their natural wonders. See Winks, supra note 13, at 585-87. The preamble cited in the 
text (written by landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.) and the remaining two 
and a half pages of the Organic Act were the result of the 64th Congress's decision to 
sketch the System in very general terms. See id. at 595-96. This approach avoided previous 
pitfalls of failed national park legislation, such as disagreements about whether a fee 
should be charged to Americans entering units in automobiles. See id. at 595. 
15 See RICHARD "WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HIS-
TORY 9-10 (1997). 
16 See id. 
17 SeeWinks, supra note 13, at 596. 
18 See id. at 585-87 (quoting President William Howard Taft's 1912 comments on the 
importance of national parks). 
19 See Ann E. Lane, Scenic Air Tours Over Our National Parks: Exploitation of Our National 
Resources or Environmental Solution?, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 523,526 (1996). 
20 See id. 
21 See 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). 
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authority includes establishing regulations "concerning boating and 
other activities on or relating to waters located within areas of the Na-
tional Park System. "22 These regulations appear in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations and have the force of law.2!1 The nature of NPS rules 
and regulations varies: some are very broad and apply System-wide, 
while others are very specific and pertain only to particular System 
units.24 
Since 1916, two series of Organic Act amendments extended the 
discussion about the management role of NPS.25 The first series of 
amendments was included in the General Authorities Act of 1970.26 
The amendments declared that, although individual park units were 
distinct in character, they were "united ... into one national park sys-
tem as cumulative expressions of a single national heritage; [and] that 
. . . these areas derive increased national dignity and recognition of 
their superb environmental quality through their inclusion jointly 
with· each other in one national park system."27 The amendments also 
directed that, except for statutes specifying treatment for particular 
park units, laws pertaining to park administration should be consis-
tently applied to all units throughout the System.28 A System unit's 
designation as a park, monument, or recreation area was irrelevant.29 
Legislative history accompanying the amendments acknowledged 
that the concept of national parks had broadened from natural and 
scientific areas to include battlegrounds and historic locations, as well 
as outdoor recreational areas.!IO Recognizing that the new and ex-
panded park uses could pose threats to the natural resources of the 
System units, Congress proclaimed NPS's objective to be conserving 
and protecting the parks for the edification and enjoyment of the 
American public.:n Congress emphasized that despite the diversity of 
the System, all laws relating to its management should be applied uni-
formly.!l2 Courts and commentators characterize the 1970 amend-
ments as a disapproval of NPS management policies that, at the tiine, 
DId. § 1a-2(h). 
25 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 800. 
24Seeid. 
2S See Wmks, supra note 13, at 577. 
26 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I. 
~ Id. 
28 See itl. § Ie. 
29Seeid. 
so SeeH.R. REp. No. 91-1265 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 3785, 3785. 
51 See id. at 3785-87. 
"Seeid. 
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divided park administration into three management categories-natu-
ral, historical, and recreational---with policies contingent upon the 
nature of the areas and their historical uses. 55 
In 1978, Congress again amended the Organic Act and discussed 
how NPS was to best achieve its underlying goals.54 These amend-
ments provided in part that "the authorization of activities shall be 
construed and the protection, management, and administration of 
these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and 
integrity of the National Park System."55 The amendments also in-
cluded what is widely known today as the "exceptions clause," a decla-
ration that System units not be managed in derogation of the values 
and purposes for which they were established "except as may have 
been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress."56 
Congress passed this series of amendments as a rider to the Red-
wood National Park Expansion Act, declaring that the promotion and 
regulation of the System must be consistent with the Organic Act, and 
that management of areas within the System should not compromise 
their resource values unless specifically provided by Congress. 57 This 
declaration, in turn, led Congress to conclude that the Secretary of 
the Interior was to afford the highest standard of protection and care 
to the lands within Redwood National Park.58 More broadly, the 
United States Senate directed that "the Secretary has an absolute duty, 
which is not to be compromised, to fulfill the mandate of the 1916 Act 
[and] to take whatever actions and seek whatever relief as will safe-
guard the units of the National Park System."59 
Accompanying the House Report was the favorable report of the 
Department of the Interior: a report in which then-Secretary of the 
53 See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 204-05 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (noting that NPS was rethinking categorical management policies in light of 
1970 amendments); MICHAEL A MANTELL & PHn.Jp C. METZGER, MANAGING NATIONAL 
PARK SYSTEM RESOURCES: A HANDBOOK ON LEGAL DUTIES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND TOOLS 
13-14 (Michael A Mantell ed., 1990). The 1970 congressional amendments eventually led 
NPS to discontinue its categorical management policies and to conclude that the System 
should be administered as an integrated whole unless provided otherwise by a System 




57 SeeH.R REP. No. 95-581, pt. I, at 21 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 463, 467. 
S8Seeid. 
59 Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-
528 (1977». 
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Interior Andrus supported the Organic Act amendment.40 Secretary 
Andrus reasoned that it was necessary to further define the duties of 
the Secretary of the Interior and the limitations in the administration 
of the System, and underscored that these duties and limitations must 
be consistent with the "high purposes" established in the 1916 Or-
ganic Act.41 There appears to be a general consensus that the 1978 
amendment was intended to strengthen the Secretary of the Interior's 
ability to protect national park resources.42 
B. Park Unit Enabling Legislation 
A natural, historical, or recreational area becomes a unit of the 
National Park System by an act of Congress, more commonly known 
as enabling legislation, or by presidential proclamation through an 
executive order.43 Typical enabling legislation explains the purpose of 
a particular System unit, sets forth the boundaries of a System unit, 
and dictates any other operating conditions that may apply to it.44 As 
part of its statement of purpose, certain uses may be specified, includ-
ing a provision allowing the continuation of preexisting uses (e.g. 
hunting or waterskiing). 45 In the case of recreation areas, NPS and 
System unit superintendents may allow a wider range of activities, 
such as winter or water sports, depending on the location and nature 
of the System unit. 46 
As provided in both the 1970 and 1978 amendments to the Or-
ganic Act, NPS must manage each System unit in accordance with its 
enabling legislation.47 The enabling legislation--as an example of a 
direct and specific mandate from Congress---is the only acceptable 
circumstance under which NPS can activate the exceptions clause and 
derogate the high public value and integrity of the System.48 
Following are some excerpts from System unit enabling legisla-
tion particularly relevant to this Comment. In establishing Padre Is-
land National Seashore, Congress named its goal as saving and pre-
40 See H.R. REp. No. 95-581, at 33. 
41 Seeid. 
4t See, e.g., MANrEu. & METZGER, supra note 33, at 15; Winks, supra note 13, at 578-79. 
45 See MANrEu. & METZGER, supra note 33, at 16; Criteria for Parklands (visited Jan. 3, 
1999) <http://www.nps.gov/legacy/criteria.html> [hereinafter Criteriafor Parklands]. 
44 See MANrEu. & METZGER, supra note 33, at 16; Criteria for Parlclands, supra note 43. 
45 See MANrEu. & METZGER, supra note 33, at 16; Criteria for Parlclands, supra note 43. 
46 See MANrEu. & METZGER, supra note 33, at 16; Criteria for Parklands, supra note 43. 
47 See 16 U.S.C. §§ la-I, Ie (1994). 
46 Seeid. 
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serving---for purposes of public recreation, benefit, and inspira-
tion--a portion of undeveloped and diminishing seashore.49 Mter 
describing its boundaries, the Interior Secretary's power to acquire 
property within the System unit, and other administrative responsibili-
ties, Congress also provided that NPS should manage Padre Island in 
light of the Organic Act's mandate.5o However, the System unit's ena-
bling legislation qualified NPS's adherence to the mandate when it 
stated that "authority otherwise available to the Secretary for the con-
servation and management of natural resources may be utilized to the 
extent ... [that] such authority will further the purposes of sections 
[of this enabling legislation]. "51 There is no explicit authorization for 
preexisting uses in the legislation.52 
The System unit enabling legislation for Bighorn Canyon Na-
tional Recreation Area followed a similar format.53 In addition to pro-
viding for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment, Bighorn was 
established for the preservation of the scenic, scientific, and historic 
features contributing to the enjoyment of the waters.54 More 
specifically, it authorized the Crow Indian Tribe to develop and oper-
ate water-based recreational facilities, including landing ramps, boat-
houses, and fishing facilities.55 
Finally, the System unit enabling legislation for Amistad National 
Recreation Area also reflected a dual mandate of public outdoor rec-
reation use and enjoyment on the one hand, and protection of scenic, 
scientific, and cultural resources on the other.56 Like Padre Island, the 
enabling legislation also directed NPS to administer the System unit 
in a manner consistent with the Organic Act's dual mandate.57 The 
Secretary of the Interior may also utilize statutory authority to protect 
natural and cultural resources.58 Hunting and fishing are permitted in 
Amistad.59 
49 See ill. § 459d. 
50 See id. §§ 459d, d-I, d4. 
51 [d. § 459d4. 
52 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459d to 459d-7. 
53 See id. § 460t. 
54 See id. 
55 Seeid. § 460t-l(c). 
56 See ill. § 460fff( a) . 
57 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459d4, 46Offf-1 (a). 
58 See id. § 46Offf-1 (a). 
59 See id. § 460fff-1 (d)( I) . 
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C. Judicial Interpretations 
1. The Scope ofNPS's Authority to Regulate 
Although the 1916 Organic Act expressly delegated rulemaking 
authority to NPS, it is otherwise silent about how the agency should 
implement the Act's preservation and use mandates.60 In reviewing 
NPS regulations, courts generally afford the agency broad discretion 
in management decisions, analyzing rules to ensure that they are not 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.61 This def-
erential review has led courts to uphold restrictions on, and allow-
ances for, visitor uses in the System so long as the decision has a ra-
tional basis in the Organic Act and accompanying legislative histories, 
System unit enabling legislation, and/or appropriate regulations.62 
In addressing challenges to NPS's interpretation of the Organic 
Act, courts generally apply the two-part analysis developed in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. 'U Natural Resources DeJense CouncilS! First, a reviewing court 
employs traditional tools of statutory construction to examine 
whether Congress has unambiguously addressed the issue in ques-
tion.64 If it has, effect must be given to Congress's clear intent.65 If 
Congress has not addressed the issue or is ambiguous about its intent, 
a court must defer to the agency's expertise so long as the agency's 
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.66 
There may be more than one permissible construction of a statutory 
mandate.67 
Courts have relied upon this two-part analysis to uphold a 
"closed-unless-designated-<>pen" approach to off-road bicycling in Sys-
60 See id. § 3 (providing that "the Secretary of the Interior shall make and publish such 
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of 
the parks, monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park SeIV-
ice.,,); Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996). 
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994). Since the Organic Act does not provide for or pro-
hibit judicial review, the Administrative Procedure Act governs standards of reviewability. 
Seeid. 
62 See BifJjck 1Tails Counci4 82 F.3d at 1451. 
63 See id. (quoting Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984»; National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp.903 (D.D.C. 
1986). 
64 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1211 (D. Utah 
1998) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984». 
63Seeid. 
fi6Seeid. 
67 See BifJjck Trails Counci4 82 F.3d at 1452. 
252 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:243 
tern units.68 It was also used to reject a challenge to NPS's decision to 
prohibit hunting and trapping in the System except where specifically 
contemplated by Congress.69 In both contexts, reviewing courts relied 
on the language of the Organic Act and its amendments as well as leg-
islative histories to arrive at their conclusions.7o 
One issue that is embedded in most challenges to NPS's statutory 
interpretations in the context of prohibiting or allowing visitor activi-
ties is the perceived conflict between the Organic Act's "preservation" 
and "use" mandates.71 Generally, it appears that the "preservation" 
mandate is deemed superior to the "use" mandate.72 Again, the lan-
guage of the Organic Act, its amendments, and legislative histories, as 
well as the interaction between the Organic Act and subsequent unit 
enabling legislation, are all relied upon to draw this conclusion.73 
Such a finding provides a solid foundation on which courts then base, 
at least in part, approval of NPS restrictions upon visitor uses.74 
Despite this consensus, however, some courts appear to be reluc-
tant to elevate the "preservation" mandate above the "use" mandate.7s 
Rather, courts seem to inquire whether the proposed prohibition (or 
allowance) is a reasonable accommodation of conflicting mandates.76 
68 See id. at 1453-54. The challenged regulation read, in part: "use of a bicycle is pro-
hibited .... Routes may only be designated for bicycle use based on a written determina-
tion that such use is consistent with the protection of the park area's natural, scenic and 
aesthetic values, safety considerations and management objectives and will not disturb 
wildlife or park resources. " 36 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998). 
69 See National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 911 (D.D.C. 1986). 
70 See BicyeU! Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1452-54 (reasoning the Organic Act and the 1970 
and 1978 amendments clearly intended that NPS manage all System areas uniformly with 
the fundamental goal as resource protection, or, alternatively, even if Congress was am-
biguous about off-road bicycling, reasonable statutory interpretation permitted a prohibi-
tion); Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10 (citing Congress's failure to explicitly allow hunting 
and trapping in the Organic Act, but stating that if particular System unit enabling legisla-
tion expressly authorized it, NPS could permissibly interpret the Organic Act as prohibit-
ing hunting and trapping generally) . 
71 See, e.g., BicyeU! Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1452; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10; Southern 
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1211 (D. Utah 1998). 
72 See, e.g., BicyeU! Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1452; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10. 
73 See, e.g., BicyeU! Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1452-53 (citing language and legislative his-
tory of 1970 and 1978 amendments to reason safeguarding the integrity and resource val-
ues of the System is NPS' overarching management concern); Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10 
(highlighting Organic Act's referencing a single purpose--conservation--in support of 
general ban on hunting and trapping). 
74 See, e.g., BicyeU! Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1452-53; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10. 
75 See, e.g., Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12. 
76 See Kleppe, 608 F.2d at 1254 (stating that where several administrative solutions exist 
for a problem, courts will uphold anyone with a rational basis); Southern Utah Wilderness 
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An accommodation is reasonable unless a statute or legislative history 
indicates it is not one Congress would have sanctioned." Also relevant 
to a balancing of the two mandates are the nature and extent of ac-
tual or potential damage to a System unit's natural resources and 
NPS's efforts to mitigate such damage.78 This approach has led courts, 
for example, to uphold NPS decisions allowing snowmobiling and off-
road vehicles in particular System units, despite System-wide bans, be-
cause actual or potential damage was minimal and temporary. 79 
Two other closely-related issues that are often discussed by courts 
in deciding whether NPS's actions are arbitrary and capricious are the 
sufficiency of the administrative record and/or the adequacy of the 
agency explanation. so Although deferential to agency decisions under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, the agency decision will be held 
invalid if the agency has offered an explanation for its decision that 
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.81 Essentially, the evidence in the administrative rec-
ord needs to provide a rational foundation upon which NPS may base 
its action.82 
In practice, courts seem reluctant to strike down NPS's record or 
explanation as unsatisfactory.83 For example, despite both a Fish and 
Wildlife Service biological opinion that concluded that snowmobiling 
was not by itself harmful to wildlife and enabling legislation that per-
mitted the activity, anecdotal evidence was enough to support NPS's 
decision to prohibit snowmobiling in a particular System unit.84 In 
another decision, a court found that NPS's reference to "public safety, 
resource protection, and the avoidance of visitor conflicts" was an 
Alliance, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1211 (stating that any reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
mandates is permissible). 
77 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. 
78 See Voyageurs Region Nat'l Park Ass'n v. Lujan', 966 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(finding snowmobile use within a corridor of a national park acceptable because of evi-
dence that snowmobiling would not permanently change area); Suuthern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12 (allowing off-road vehicles in part of System units where 
unique resources would not be severely or permanently impaired). 
79 See VOYagmlT.f Region Nat'l Park Ass'n, 966 F.2d at 427; Suuthern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 
7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12. 
80 See Mausolfv. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1997); Bicycle Trails Council v. 
Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1996). 
81 See Mausolf, 125 F.3d at 669 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983». 
82 See id. 
es See id. at 669-70; Bicycle Trails Cuunci~ 82 F.3d at 1455-56. 
84 See Mausolf, 125 F.3d at 669-70. 
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adequate explanation of the agency's decision to ban off-road bicy-
cling throughout the System.85 
2. The Scope of the Exceptions Clause 
One of the principal ways NPS's broad authority to regulate can 
be harnessed is if a System unit's enabling legislation specifically pro-
vides for, or prohibits, a particular use.86 Such a provision fulfills the 
directive in Section One of the Organic Act that the System shall not 
be managed in "derogation of the values and purposes for which 
these various areas have been established, except as may have been or 
shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress. "87 Although 
there is unquestioning adherence to a congressional mandate calling 
for a particular use, courts continue to grapple with questions of how 
narrow a congressional mandate must be to fall within the exceptions 
clause and how to handle the situation of conflicting mandates within 
enabling legislation.88 
Relevant case law seems to indicate that the exceptions clause is 
only triggered if enabling legislation explicitly authorizes a particular 
activity or pertinent legislative history mentions it.89 Courts appear to 
reject arguments that an activity in question is a subset of a previously 
authorized activity.90 Similarly, if enabling legislation other than the 
legislation in question has explicitly authorized an activity, the excep-
tions clause does not apply.91 One of the strongest examples of this 
reasoning is Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, a Sixth Circuit 
case which rejected the claim that enabling legislation of two national 
lakeshores which explicitly permitted hunting also implicitly permit-
ted trapping.92 
85 See Bicycle Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1456; infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text 
(discussing adequacy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrntion's concise 
and general statement explaining its PWC ban in a marine sanctuary). 
86 See 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1994). 
87Id. 
88 See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 206-07 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Bicycle Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1460-61; National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. 
Supp. 903, 911-12 (D.D.C. 1986). 
89 See Michigan United Conservatiqn Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207-08. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 208. 
92 See 949 F.2d at 203-04. Trapping, like hunting, is prohibited generally in all units of 
the National Park System. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.2(b) (1998). In this case, the court relied on 
National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, a case cited throughout this Comment, to deny that trnpping is 
a subset of hunting, reasoning that because Congress has generally provided for trnpping 
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Statutory language appears to be the key when analyzing ena-
bling legislation that cites multiple purposes.93 If enabling legislation 
discusses preserving a System unit's scenic and scientific natural re-
sources while simultaneously maintaining that the unit be used for 
recreational opportunities, such dual mandates appear to limit reli-
ance on the exceptions clause.94 Also preventing the complete dero-
gation of resource values in favor of recreational pursuits is a direc-
tion in System unit enabling legislation to administer the unit in a 
manner consistent with Section One of the Organic Act and, im-
pliedly, its focus on resource protection.95 
The Ninth Circuit case of Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt illustrates 
these principles of construction.96 In addition to deciding whether a 
general ban on off-road bicycling was reasonable, the Ninth Circuit 
also addressed whether NPS's proposed off-road bicycle trail plan in 
the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) was reason-
able.97 The court found that the plan was reasonable and rejected the 
plaintiff's contention that bicyclists were not given priority as required 
by enabling legislation.98 While acknowledging that recreational issues 
were the predominant concern of NPS and GGNRA officials, lan-
guage in GGNRA enabling legislation, which called for preserving the 
area as much as possible in its natural setting, prevented a complete 
derogation of any interest other than recreational use.99 In addition, 
the GGNRA Act provided that NPS should administer the area in ac-
cordance with Section One of the Organic Act and its emphasis on 
natural resource protection.1OO 
D. NPS Management Policies 
NPS Management Policies function as the agency's internal 
guidelines for administrative decisions.101 In addition to covering such 
explicitly, an omission in other statutes must be presumed to be intentional. See Michigan 
United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207-08. 
95 See Bicycle Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1461 (citing language of unit enabling legislation 
to reach conclusion). 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 1457-58. 
98 See Bicycle Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1459-61. 
99 See id. at 1461. 
100 See id. 
101 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 800. There is some controversy over whether the NPS 
Management Policies have the force of law. See id. (noting cases in which the court has 
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specific topics as land management, natural resource management, 
and visitor use, the policies outline three broad principles articulated 
by then-Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to the first director 
of NPS.I02 The three principles provide: (1) the national parks must 
be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future 
generations as well as those of our own time; (2) the national parks 
must be set apart for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the 
people; and (3) the national interest must dictate all decisions affect-
ing public or private enterprise in the parks. lOS 
In the "Introduction" to these policies, NPS addresses the tension 
between Congress's mandate to conserve resources while also provid-
ing for visitor enjoyment.104 Despite this conflicting mandate, NPS 
permits park superintendents, if and when there is a reasonable basis 
to believe a resource is or will become impaired, to temporarily close 
a specific area or otherwise place limitations on public use.105 
In the situation of recreational areas, NPS manages System units 
so as to protect park resources, provide for public enjoyment, pro-
mote public safety, and minimize conflicts with other visitor activi-
ties.I06 NPS seeks consistency in recreation management policies and 
procedures, to the extent practicable, while still acknowledging that 
differences in individual park enabling legislation may mean that an 
activity entirely appropriate for one location may be inappropriate if 
conducted in another location.I°7 Unless a use is mandated by statute, 
NPS will not allow a recreational activity in a System unit if it has an 
unacceptable impact on System unit resources or natural processes, if 
it is inconsistent with the System unit's enabling legislation or proc-
lamation, or if it results in a derogation of the values or purposes for 
which the System unit was established. lOS 
appeared to decide both ways). None of the cases surveyed for this Comment explicitly 
address this issue, but several of them do cite NPS Management Policies. See, e.g., Michigan 
United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 204--05 (6th Cir. 1991). 
102 See National Park Service, NPS Management Policies: Introduction (visited Jan. 1, 1999) 
<http://www.nps.gov/planning/mngmtplc/npsmpint.html> [hereinafter NPS Manage-
ment Policies: Introduction]. 
lOS Seeid. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 See National Park Service, NPS Management Policies: Visitor Use (visited Jan. 1, 1999) 
<http://www.nps.gov/planning/mngmtplc/upvu.html> [hereinafter NPS Management 
Policies: Visitor Use] . 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
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II. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF PERSONAL WATERCRAFT 
PWC are a type of recreational boat commonly known as jet skis 
or waverunners.109 PWC are powered by two-cycle gasoline engines 
and in-board motors, and are less than sixteen feet in length.110 They 
feature both sit-down and stand-up styles and include one-, two-, and 
three-person models.lll The PWC industry is the fastest growing seg-
ment of marine business and represented thirty-six percent of all new 
powerboat sales in 1997.112 The United States Coast Guard estimates 
that more than one million PWC were in operation during the 1997 
boating season.lIS Between 1987 and 1997, PWC annual sales in-
creased from 29,000 vessels to more than 176,000 vessels,l14 According 
to industry statistics, most PWC owners are male, in their early forties, 
and previous owners of powerboats.ll5 
One of the biggest concerns about PWC use shared by govern-
ment agencies, the boating industry, and members of the general 
public is the PWC safety record. A recent study conducted by the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board determined that the number of 
PWC fatalities more than tripled between 1993 and 1997.116 In addi-
tion, the leading cause of death in PWC accidents is blunt force 
trauma; in other recreational boating accidents the leading cause of 
death is drowning.ll7 According to United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
reports, PWC account for eleven percent of all watercraft registered in 
the United States, but are involved in thirty-five percent of all boating 
accidents.118 
Also of concern to the public and environmental groups alike, is 
the destruction PWC cause to water, aquatic vegetation, and wildlife. 
109 See The Personal Watercraft story (visited Jan. 2, 1999) <http://www.pwia.org-
/ Abo_PWC.htm> [hereinafter Personal Watercraft Story]. There are five companies active in 
the PWC market: Kawasaki, Yamaha, Bombardier Recreational Products, Arctic Cat, and 




112 See Elliott Almond, Making Waves, SEA'ITLE TIMEs, July 23, 1998, at C1; Personal Wa,-
tercraft Story, supra note 109. 
113 See Personal Watercraft Story, supra note log. 
114Seeid. 
1l5Seeid. 
116 See NATIONAL lRANsP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/SS-98/0I, PERsONAL WATERCRAFI' 
SAFETY V (1998). In 1993, there were twenty-six PWC fatalities, and in 1997 there were 
eighty-three PWC fatalities. See id. 
117 Seeid. 
118 SeeAlmond, supra note 112. 
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PWC two-stroke engines not only pollute water and air by discharging 
twenty to forty percent of consumed fuel into their environs, but also 
emit a loud noise that disturbs fish, wildlife, and other recreation-
ists.1l9 In addition, the shallow-draft design of PWC enables the vessels 
to operate in water less than one foot deep, allowing PWC to sweep 
close enough to shore to disrupt bird and wildlife habitats.120 Opera-
tion in shallow water may also stir up the water's floor, causing 
cloudiness and limiting light penetration and oxygen needed by fish 
and bird populations.121 Shallow water PWC use also threatens sea 
grass.122 
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF PERSONAL WATERCRAFT LAw 
A. Federal Law 
Turning from PWC characteristics and effects to the current law 
governing the vessels, PWC are regulated by USCG as Class Aves-
sels.12!1 Under this classification, which also applies to motorboats in 
general, USCG sets forth uniform minimum requirements such as life 
preserver and fire extinguisher equipment standards.124 In the Or-
ganic Act, Congress qualified NPS's ability to regulate the waters 
within the System by directing that "any regulations adopted pursuant 
to this subsection shall be complementary to, and not in derogation 
of, the authority of the United States Coast Guard to regulate the use 
of waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. "125 
Legislative history accompanying the amendment extending 
NPS's authority to water indicates that the purpose of NPS's regula-
119 See NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION AsS'N, BAN SOUGHT ON JET SKIS IN NA-
TIONAL PARKS (May 19, 1998); David Brauer, Water Scooters Creating a Legal splash, CHI. 
TRIB., May 26, 1998, at 6; Winegar, supra note 10. 
120 See David Holmstrom, Water "Mot{J1"cycks· Catch Negative spray; Industry Looks j{J1" Way 
to Resol:ve Environmentalists' Concerns about PoUution, Noise, and Habitat Disruption, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 20,1998, at 14. 
121 See Terry Tomalin, Personal Watercraft: The Great Outdoors, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
June 20, 1998, at 7. 
122 See id. The Personal Watercraft Industry Association disputes and downplays possi-
ble damage to seagrasses, marine mammals, fish, and other aquatic life. See PlWA: Envi-
ronmental Protection (visited Jan. 2, 1999) <http://www.pwia.org/Env]WC.htm>. The 
Association maintains that PWC will lose power if operated in areas containing vegetation 
and sediment, as these materials will be drawn into the jet pumps powering the vessels. See 
id. 
123 See 46 C.FR § 24.10-17 (1997). 
124 See id. at §§ 24.10-17, 25.25, 25.30. 
125 16 U.S.C. § la-2 (h) (1994). 
2000] Ban on Personal Watercraft Use 259 
tory power in this sphere was to protect natural, wildlife, cultural, and 
historical resources in light of significant increases in recreational 
boating.I26 The legislative history also illustrates that USCG, while 
agreeing that NPS should have some authority to regulate water, 
wanted to retain ultimate authority over issues such as boat design, 
safety and numbering, and vessel documentation and inspection re-
quirements.127 
Although the proposed ban on PWC marks the first time NPS has 
addressed PWC use System-wide, the agency or individual System unit 
superintendents banned or severely restricted the use of these motor-
ized vehicles in at least seven System units prior to the rulemaking,128 
For example, NPS banned PWC use in Everglades National Park be-
cause activities such as waterskiing and the use of PWC were incom-
patible with preserving serenity and other '\vilderness" qualities,129 
Such activities, NPS reasoned, undercut the unit's purpose of protect-
ing a unique natural system.IlIO 
NPS also banned PWC use on Lake Crescent located in Olympic 
National Park in Washington State.1lI1 Although NPS acknowledged 
that current PWC use was low (but increasing), it based its decision 
on conflicts with other visitor uses caused by the crafts, including their 
frequent proximity to boats and the shoreline and the noise emitted 
by their engines.IS2 NPS interpreted this type of by-product as a direct 
contravention of the unit's purpose as set forth in the Olympic Na-
126 SeeH.R. REP. No. 94-1569, 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 4290, 4298-99. 
127 See id. at 24. 
128 See NATIONAL PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTEIuOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 
ANNOUNCES PROPOSED RULE FOR PERsONAL WATERCRAFT USE IN PARKS (Sept. 15, 1998). 
PWC have been banned at the following units: Yellowstone National Park, Canyonlands 
National Park, Everglades National Park, Glacier National Park, Ozark National Scenic 
Riverways, and Golden Gate National Recreation Area. See id.; U.S. DEP'T OF THE lNTE-
RIOR, THE GoLDEN GATE NATIONAL RECREATION AREA TO PROIUBIT USE OF JET SKIS (PER-
SONAL WATERCRAFT) IN PARK WATERS EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1 (Oct. 28, 1998). 
129 See Everglades National Park Special Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,781, 58,782 
(1994). The ban was promulgated under 36 C.F.R. section 1.5, which authorizes closures 
and public use limits based on a determination that action is necessary for "the mainte-
nance of public health and safety, protection of environmental or scenic values, protection 
of natural or cultural resources, . . . [ or] implementation of management responsibilities. " 
See 36 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1998). 
130 Seeid. 
151 See National Park Service, Appendix A: Administrative &curd Detailing the NPS Decision 
to Ban the Use of Personal Watercraft on Lake Crescent Olympic National Pam, Washington (visited 
Jan. I, 1999) <http://www.nps.gov/htdocs4/olym/lceis/lca.html> [hereinafter NPS ~ 
pendixA]. 
152 Seeid. 
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tional Park Master Plan)SS The Plan portrayed the unit as providing 
"special peace and renewal of the human spirit that undeveloped, un-
spoiled land can offer .... "1M 
Adverse environmental impacts also motivated the ban.lM PWC 
use displaced Lake Crescent wildlife, such as river otters and other 
waterfowl, and threatened shoreline vegetation. 1M Additionally, NPS 
cited the discharge of non-combusted oil into the waters of Lake 
Crescent.lS7 
To date, there has been only one reported case involving a fed-
eral agency and a PWC ban. In Personal Watercraft Industry Ass 'n v. De-
partment of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit confirmed an administrative 
agency's authority to limit the use of PWC,1!l8 The National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), under authority granted 
to it by the Secretary of Commerce, promulgated regulations limiting 
the operation of PWC to four designated zones in the Monterey Bay 
National Marine Sanctuary (Sanctuary).IS9 The regulation did not 
restrict the use of other types of vessels used in the Sanctuary)40 The 
plaintiff, an organization representing PWC manufacturers and dis-
tributors, challenged the regulation as arbitrary and capricious, alleg-
ing it was based on inadequate evidence and that there was no basis 
for regulating PWC but not other vessels.Hl 
The court rejected this challenge, primarily focusing on NOAA's 
ability to single-out PWC for different treatment.l42 It found that 
NOAA could treat PWC differently because agencies can confront 
problems one step at a time so long as the treatment is reasonable,14S 
In this case, according to the court, it was reasonable to ban PWC 
from all but fourteen of the 4000 square nautical miles encompassing 
the Sanctuary because the craft interfered with the public's recrea-




136 See NPS Appendix A, supra note 131. 
157 Seeid. 
138 See 48 F.3d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
159 See id. at 541-42. 
140 See id. at 542. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 544. 
145 See Personal Watem"aft Indus. Ass 'n, 48 F.3d at 544-46. 
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and fauna. l44 This interference undercut the concept of a sanctuary 
that encompassed the elements of serenity, peace, and tranquility,145 
The Persunal Watercraft court went on to reason that the distinc-
tion NOAA drew between PWC and other vessels was acceptable be-
cause of the differences in size and maneuverability of PWC,146 The 
smaller size and greater maneuverability of PWC allowed them to op-
erate closer to shore, in areas of high concentrations of kelp forests, 
marine mammals, and sea birds which larger, slower crafts could not 
enter.147 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit also rejected the challenger's claim that 
NOAA did not satisfactorily explain its actions.l48 The court reasoned 
that NOAA fulfilled the requirement under the Administrative Proce-
dures Actl49 to provide a "concise general statement" of the regula-
tion's "basis and purpose" when it highlighted the destruction caused 
only by PWC and its intention to protect natural resources. ISO 
B. State and Local Law 
Currently, at least thirty-four states have implemented or are con-
templating some type of legislation or regulation specific to PWC 
use.l51 Many of these laws impose minimum age, education, and train-
ing requirements, as well as wake-jumping and area use restrictions, 
speed limits, and limitations on night use or required adult supervi-
sion.152 In addition, some counties and cities have also begun to regu-
late PWC use along their shorelines.153 
144 See id. at 545 (noting the disturbance to sea otters, harbor seals, and the Sanctuary's 
kelp forests caused by PWC.) 
145 See id. 
146 Seeid. 
147 Seeid. 
145 See Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass 'n, 48 F.3d at 545. 
149 See5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994); Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n, 48 F.3d at 545. 
1!SO See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n, 48 F.3d at 545. 
151 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312,49,314 
(1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). 
152 Seeid. 
153 See, e.g., Sward & Doyle, supra note 10 (citing San Francisco Board of Supervisors-
imposed ban on jet skis within 1200 feet of the city's shoreline). Increased PWC regulation 
on state and local levels has resulted in a number of lawsuits questioning the regulatory 
scope of states, counties, and/or cities in the PWC context. See gener~ Buckley v. City of 
Redding, 66 F.3d 188 (9th Gir. 1995); Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 861 P.2d 1 (Haw. 
1993). 
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IV. THE NPS PROPOSED BAN ON PERSONAL WATERCRAFT 
A. Text of the Proposed Rule 
On September 15, 1998, NPS announced a System-wide ban on 
PWC.154 In its proposed rule, it defines PWC in part as 
a vessel, usually less than 16 feet in length, which uses an in-
board, internal combustion engine powering a water jet 
pump as its primary source of propulsion. The vessel is in-
tended to be operated by a person or persons sitting, stand-
ing or kneeling on the vessel, rather than within the confines 
of the hull.155 
The proposed rule mandates that the use of PWC is allowed only in 
designated areas within the System.156 
Generally, designation of areas allowing PWC use requires the 
promulgation of a special regulation.157 However, thirteen units may 
forego this procedure and authorize PWC use under the procedures 
of 36 C.F.R. sections 1.5 and 1.7.158 For the thirteen specified units, 
the provisions of the proposed rule do not apply until two years after 
a final regulation is issued.159 NPS also provides a two-year grace pe-
riod for an additional twelve park units, if appropriate, to promulgate 
special regulations to designate use areas for PWC.I60 During the two 
years, these twelve units can authorize PWC use under the procedures 
of36 C.F.R. sections 1.5 and 1.7.161 
154 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,316. 
155Id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 49,316. 
156 See id. The thirteen units are: Amistad, Bighorn Canyon, Chickasaw, Curecanti, 
Gateway, Glen Canyon, Golden Gate, Lake Mead, Lake Meredith, Lake Roosevelt, Whis-
keytown-Shasta-Trinity National Recreation Areas, and Gulf Islands and Padre Islands Na-
tional Seashores. See id. 
159 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,316. 
160 See id. The additional twelve areas are: Assateague Island, Cape Canaveral, Cape 
Cod, Cape Hatteras, Cape Lookout, Cumberland Island, and Fire Island National Sea-
shores; Indiana Dunes, Pictured Rocks, and Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshores; 
and Delaware Water Gap and Chattahoochee River National Recreation Areas. See id. 
161 See id. at 49,316. 
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B. Background 
NPS invoked its regulatory powers and responsibilities under the 
Organic Act's mandate to propose the System-wide ban.162 In the sup-
plementary information accompanying the proposed rule, NPS char-
acterized its approach to PWC use in the System as conservative.I63 
NPS presumes, as a general matter, that PWC use is inappropriate in 
most units of the System.l64 NPS based its decision, in part, on safety 
concerns (particularly the high accident rates of the vessels) .165 
NPS also cited adverse environmental impacts as a reason for the 
rule, including the ability of PWC to penetrate aquatic vegetation in 
shallow areas, elevated noise levels, and discharge of oil and gas mix-
tures into water.l66 Wildlife harms included interruption of normal 
activity and alarm or flight, loss of habitat use, decreased reproductive 
success, and direct mortality.167 
In explaining its decision to regulate PWC but not other conven-
tional watercraft in this manner, NPS made several distinctions.l68 
First, the agency pointed to general differences in design, use, safety 
record, controversy, and visitor and resource impacts.169 Next, NPS 
distinguished the purpose of PWC, reasoning that while conventional 
watercraft provide access and enjoyment, PWC are often referred to 
as "thrill crafts, " used only for their excitement value.170 
NPS explained its provision of two methods of authorizing PWC 
use as a recognition that a System unit's enabling legislation, re-
sources and values, other visitor uses, and overall management objec-
tives may make their use appropriate in certain areas.l71 According to 
NPS, the first group of thirteen units specified in the rule-which do 
not have to apply the rule until two years after its final regula-
tion---were all established for water-related recreation and are charac-
terized by substantial motorized use.172 In these System units, a park 
superintendent would be able to use the locally-based procedures 
authorized in 36 C.F.R. sections 1.5 and 1.7 in order to "maintain [] 
162 See id. at 49,312. 
163 See id. at 49,313. 
164 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314. 
163 See id. 
166 Seeid. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 49,314-49,315. 
169 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314-49,315. 
170 Seeid. at 49,315. 
171 See id. at 49,313. 
172 See id. 
264 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:243 
public health and safety, protection of environmental or scenic values, 
protection of natural or cultural resources, . . . or the avoidance of 
conflict among visitor use activities. "173 
However, if opening up a park unit to PWC use would result in a 
significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area; ad-
versely affect the park's natural, aesthetic, scenic, or cultural values; or 
be highly controversial in nature, the superintendent must elevate the 
authorization process by participating in a rulemaking published in 
the Federal Register,174 To satisfy these locally-based procedures, a su-
perintendent must prepare a written determination, available to the 
public upon request, justifying the action,175 A superintendent must 
also notify the public about the action through posted signs, maps, 
publication in a local newspaper, or through another appropriate 
method.176 
A unit-specific rulemaking through the Federal Register is the 
process required for all park units besides the thirteen specified by 
NPS.177 NPS pointed out that such an approach is similar to ap-
proaches taken in regulating activities such as off-road bicycling and 
snowmobiling,178 Acknowledging that the promulgation of unit-
specific regulations can be time consuming, however, NPS provided 
twelve System units with a two-year grace period during which the ban 
would not be effective.179 All twelve System units are characterized by 
current PWC use and, according to the NPS, should use the reprieve 
to develop and finalize special regulations as appropriate. ISO During 
this two-year period, System unit superintendents can authorize PWC 
use under the procedures of 36 C.F.R. sections 1.5 and 1.7.181 
C. Criticism 
The Personal Watercraft Industry Association (PWIA) , an organi-
zation representing manufacturers in the PWC industry, leads the 
173 Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1998». 
174 See 63 Fed. Reg. At 49,313 (quoting 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.5(b),(e), 1.7 (1998». 
175 See 36 C.F.R. §1.5(c) (1998). 
176 Seeid. at§ 1.7(a) (1)-(4). 
177 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. A rulemaking through the Federal Register requires na-
tionwide notice and an opportunity to comment on any proposal to authorize PWC use in 
a unit of the National Park System. See ill. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
ISO See id. 
181 See id. 
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criticism of the NPS proposed ban on PWC.182 In a document written 
by Executive Director John Donaldson, PWIA outlined three per-
ceived flaws· in the NPS approach.18S 
First, PWIA argues that NPS should not ban PWC use on a Sys-
tem-wide leve1.184 PWIA characterizes the System as diverse, with each 
System unit making a unique contribution,185 The organization advo-
cates a case-by-case examination of the natural resources and visitor 
expectations of each System unit which has a boat ramp.186 It believes 
that if a System unit has a tradition of powerboats and accompanying 
water contact sports, such as water skiing and wake boarding, PWC 
use is compatible.187 
Second, PWIA contends that NPS reneged on its commitment to 
public participation in its planning process,188 It points to NPS's man-
agement policies, which require the agency to involve the public in 
decision-making about park resources,189 PWIA maintains that NPS 
should follow these management policies.1OO 
Finally, PWIA criticizes NPS's reliance on a ban to address PWC 
concerns, arguing that a ban should be a last resort.191 The organiza-
tion suggests alternatives such as designation of slow-speed, no-wake 
areas or prohibiting early morning riding as ways to eliminate user 
conflicts and protect sensitive habitats.l92 As a whole, PWIA character-
izes the NPS approach as capricious,19s 
182 See Personal Watercraft Industry Association, PmA Fact Sheet, (visited Jan. 2, 1999) 
<http://www.pwia.org/ Abo]act.httn>. 





188 See National Park Service Has Gone ThoFar, supra note 10. 
189 Seeid. 
190 See ill. 
191 See id. 
192 Seeid. 
113 See NatilJ'lUd Park Service Has Gone Tho Far, supra note 10. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. NPS's Proposed Ban Is a Reasonable Solution to a System-Wide Problem 
1. A General PWC Ban Is Appropriate 
In deciding how to address increasing PWC use within its System 
units, NPS opted to implement a System-wide ban, just as it had in the 
hunting, off-road bicycling, and snowmobiling contexts.194 A System-
wide ban is a significant change from its heretofore ad hoc or unit-by-
unit approach to PWC management.195 The Organic Act's language 
and legislative history support the proposed approach, as does rele-
vant case law.1OO 
Both Congress's broad directive to the NPS to "make and publish 
such rules and regulations . . . necessary or proper for the use and 
management of the parks ... " and its description of the System as 
"cumulative expressions of a single national heritage ... " illustrate 
that not only does NPS have the authority to ban PWC from park 
units in general, but to not do so would risk vitiating Congress's clear 
intent that NPS adopt uniform management policies.197 This argu-
ment is bolstered by legislative history of the amendment, which ex-
plicitly rejected the notion that because the System had grown to in-
clude recreation areas--the very areas in which PWC use occurs--dif-
ferent management policies were appropriate.198 
Case law interpreting the Organic Act, its amendments, and ac-
companying legislative histories also support the idea that a System-
wide ban is preferable to examining PWC use on a unit-by-unit ba-
sis.I99 Invoking the typical Chevron analysis that most courts seem to 
apply to System-wide bans, the relevant inquiry is whether Congress, 
in the Organic Act, unambiguously intended to outlaw PWC use in all 
units of the System.2OO Since the Organic Act is silent on this issue,201 
194 See generally Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1996); National 
Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 90.3 (D.D.C. 1986). 
195 See, e.g., supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text. 
196 See 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1994); Bicyck Trails C()Unci~ 82 F.3d at 1451-54; H.R. REp. No. 
91-1265 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 3785, 3785. 
197 16 U.S.C. §§ la-I, 3. 
198 See H.R. REp. No. 91-1265 at 3785-86. 
199 See, e.g., Bicyck Trails C()Unci~ 82 F.3d at 1451-54; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 906. 
200 See Bicyck Trails C()Unci~ 82 F.3d at 1452 (quoting Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984». 
201 See, e.g., Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909. But see Bicyck Trails C()Unci~ 82 F.3d at 1452-53. 
In applying the Chevron analysis, the Ninth Circuit posed the first question as to whether 
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the next question is whether NPS's "closed-unless-designated-open" 
strategy is a permissible interpretation of the Organic Act.202 
Based on both National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter and Bicycle Trails Coun-
cil v. Babbitt, discussed earlier, the System-wide PWC ban is a permissi-
ble interpretation of the Organic Act because it is sufficiently reason-
able and not manifestly contrary to the statute.20S First, the same 
deference that reviewing courts afforded to NPS's expertise in its Sys-
tem-wide bans of off-road bicycling and hunting respectively, should 
be given to NPS in the PWC context.204 This deference, in large part, 
should be based on the fact that the Organic Act is silent as to the 
specifics. of park management.205 Instead, the Organic Act provides 
NPS with broad discretion in deciding what uses of park resources are 
proper.206 Implicit in this silence and broad discretion to promulgate 
regulations is the ability of NPS to decide whether a rule should apply 
throughout the System or to individual units.2M 
Second, the reasonableness of NPS's statutory interpretation is 
underscored by what the Organic Act does say.208 The same language 
cited by the Ninth Circuit in Bicycle Trails Council emphasizing the Sec-
retary of the Interior's responsibility to administer all System units "in 
light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park Sys-
tem" is applicable in the PWC context.209 Additionally, it is also clear 
from the Organic Act's language that Congress envisioned the System 
as a single system that derives its stature---at least in part-from its 
management as an integrated whole, with each System unit adding to 
"increased national dignity. "210 This type of language strongly sup-
ports NPS's "closed-unless-designated-open" approach to PWC use.211 
Congress intended the Organic Act and the 1970 and 1978 amendments to uniformly 
manage all areas with the fundamental goal of resource protection. See Bicyck Trails Coun-
ci~ 82 F.3d at 1452. The court answered in the affirmative. See id. at 1453. Although posing 
such a question in the PWC analysis would yield the same answer (and make proceeding to 
the next question unnecessary), it seems more logical that most courts would ask a nar-
rower question which focused more on a relationship between the Organic Act and the 
specific activity in question. See, e.g., Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909. 
20! See Bicyck Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1454. 
205 See id.; 628 F. Supp. at 909-10. 
204 See Bicyck Trails Coun~ 82 F.3d at 1454; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909. 
205 See Bicyck Trails Counci~ 82 F.3d at 1454. 
I06Seeid. 
2O'ISeeid. 
l!O8 See id.; Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909. 
l!O8 82 F.3d at 1454. 
210 See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (1994); see also supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
211 See Bicyck Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1454. 
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Relevant case law also indicates that the record NPS relied upon 
and the explanation provided in proposing a System-wide ban of PWC 
are sufficient to survive an arbitrary and capricious challenge.212 NPS 
went beyond general references to "public safety, resource protection, 
and the avoidance of visitor conflicts" that courts have previously 
deemed a rational and reasoned analysis for System-wide bans by cit-
ing specific accident statistics and adverse environmental impacts 
caused by PWC.21!1 It also matched the explanation the D.C. Circuit 
deemed satisfactory in Personal Watercraft Industry Ass'n v. Department of 
Commerce, to date the only case involving a federal agency and a PWC 
ban.214 
The sufficiency of NPS's record is underscored further when 
compared to the sufficiently "rational" administrative record in Mau-
solf v. Babbitt, a case in which the Eighth Circuit, despite describing 
the record as "not overwhelming," upheld a ban on snowmobiling in 
a park unit based primarily on anecdotal evidence.215 NPS offers more 
than anecdotal evidence in support of its decision to prohibit PWC 
throughout the System, and does not face allegations that PWC do 
not pose the dangers alleged by the agency claims (as was the situa-
tion in Mausolf) .216 
2. The PWC Ban Does Not Violate the Organic Act's "Use" Mandate 
A continuing topic of discussion among both commentators and 
the courts interpreting the Organic Act is the conflicting "preserva-
tion" and "use" mandates contained in Section One.217 This discussion 
is relevant to NPS's current proposal because of the probable argu-
ment that the PWC ban completely sacrifices the "use" mandate in 
favor of "conserv[ing] the scenery and the historic objects and wild-
life ... [so as to] leave them unimpaired. "218 Such an argument fails 
because there is clear evidence that "preservation" was the paramount 
congressional mandate.219 Alternatively, even if a case can be made 
212 See id. at 1455; Mausolfv. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661,669-70 (8th Cir. 1997). 
m See 82 F.3d at 1455; Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 
49,312,49,313-14 (1998) (to be codified at 36 C.FR pts. 1 & 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). 
214 See 48 F.3d 540, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
215 See Mausolf, 125 F.3d at 669-70. 
216 See id.; 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313-49,314. 
217 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp.903, 909-10 
(D.D.C. 1986); Lane, supra note 19, at 525. . 
218 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
219 See id.; Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 (6th Cir. 
1991); Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909-10; MANTElL & METZGER, supra note 33, at 13. 
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that the mandates need to be balanced against each other, it is ac-
ceptable for an agency to resolve conflicting goals in favor of one of 
those goals so long as the accommodation is reasonable.220 
The language and structure of the Organic Act's mandate clause 
illustrate the dominance of the protectionist role of NPS.221 Although 
Congress mentioned "enjoyment" twice, both references are qualified 
by language emphasizing conservation of natural resources and, at 
least implicitly, limiting the type of acceptable enJoyment to that 
which will not degrade natural resources.222 The first "enjoyment" re-
fers to scenery, natural resources, and wildlife that NPS has "con-
served. "22S The second "enJoyment" again refers to the System units' 
natural resources, but this time also applies to future generations who 
will enjoy them in their "unimpaired" state.224 Such strong language 
supports placing preservation ahead of use and suggests that PWC use 
is not acceptable if it degrades water quality, destroys aquatic vegeta-
tion, and disrupts wildlife habitats.225 All of these adverse environ-
mental impacts prevent future generations from enJoying the System's 
natural resources that have been kept in an unimpaired state. 
Also confirming NPS's decision to safeguard System units' natu-
ral resources from PWC use are the 1978 amendment and the accom-
panying legislative history.226 While the amendment itself discussed 
"protection" of the System's integrity, the legislative history contained 
even stronger language that forbids, in general, management prac-
tices which compromise resource values.227 Read against this back-
drop, NPS is merely fulfilling its congressional mandate by prohibit-
ing PWC use within the System.228 
In addition to fulfilling its congressional mandate, NPS is also 
following its own management policies that direct System unit super-
intendents to err on the side of resource protection in situations of 
DO See Wllderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1211 (D. Utah 1998). 




22& See MANTELL & METZGER, supra note 33, at 13. The authors also make the point 
that, as a practical effect, if the preservation mandate is neglected, both conservation and 
enjoyment of the System are endangered. See id. 
226 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; H.R. REP. No. 95-581, pt. I, at 21 (1977) reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.CAN. 463, 467. 
227 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; H.R. REp. No. 95-581 at 21, 33. 
228 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; H.R. REp. No. 95-581 at 21,33. 
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user conflicts.229 It supplies this directive despite naming "use" as one 
of its broad operating principles.230 All that is required to limit public 
use of System resources is a reasonable basis to believe a resource is or 
would become impaired.231 NPS satisfied this low threshold by outlin-
ing current environmental impacts caused by PWC as well as a desire 
to prevent further destruction as recreational activity continues to 
gain popularity.232 
Finally, case law also supports elevating the Organic Act's preser-
vation mandate above the use mandate.233 National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 
discussed throughout this Comment, is often cited for this proposi-
tion because of unequivocal statements that "the paramount objective 
of the park system ... was, from the beginning, one of protectionism" 
and "[the] primary management function with respect to Park wild-
life is its preservation unless Congress has declared otherwise. "234 
Courts have relied upon Potter to reject arbitrary and capricious chal-
lenges in the hunting, trapping, off-road bicycling, and snowmobiling 
contexts.235 Language such as this can and should also be applied to 
the PWC context to arrive at a conclusion that a System-wide ban is 
consistent with NPS's overarching duty to protect natural resources.236 
Even assuming, arguendo, that resource protection is not neces-
sarily the higher mandate of the Organic Act or that environmental 
damage inflicted by PWC is not severe enough to justify ignoring the 
use mandate, the proposed ban remains a reasonable solution to a 
System-wide problem.23'7 NPS satisfied the judicial requirement of 
providing "a reasonable accommodation of conflicting mandates" in 
primarily two ways.238 First, recalling the emphasis placed on preserva-
tion in the Organic Act, its 1978 amendment, and the amendment's 
229 See NPS Management Policies: Introduction, supra note 102. 
230 See id. 
2S1 See id. 
2S2 See id.; Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 
49,313-49,314 (1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R pts. 1 & 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). 
2S5 See Michigan United Conservation Clubsv. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202,207 (6th Cir. 1991); 
National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 909-10, 912 (D.D.C. 1986). 
2M 628 F. Supp. at 905, 912. In this opinion, the court also directed attention to the 
1978 amendment's reference to a singular "purpose" of the Organic Act. See id. at 910. 
235 See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207; Bicycle Trails Council v. 
Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996). 
256 See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207; Bicycle Trails Counci4 82 
F.3d at 1450. 
2S7 See Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1211 (D. Utah 1998). 
258 See Kkppe, 608 F.2d at 1254; Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. SUPP' 2d at 1211. 
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legislative history, the ban is consistent with Congress's intent to pro-
tect the System's natural resources.259 Therefore, it is likely that Con-
gress would sanction the ban.240 
Second, NPS has provided two methods for designating PWC use 
within System units when certain conditions are satisfied.241 Analyti-
cally, this accommodation of the "use" mandate is similar to NPS's al-
lowance of jeep trails in certain System units where unique resources 
would not be severely or permanently impaired.242 Both situations 
reflect good faith attempts to provide a meaningful balance between 
the preservation and use mandates of the Organic Act.243 
As illustrated in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dalmey, possi-
ble qualifications on such an accommodation appear to be the nature 
and extent of damage to the System's natural resources, as well as the 
effectiveness of NPS's efforts to mitigate this damage.244 Unwilling to 
forego a general ban because of the serious safety and environmental 
threats PWC pose to System units, NPS nonetheless attempted to ac-
commodate the use mandate by allowing more relaxed authorization 
procedures in units that were created for water-related, recreational 
purposes rather than preservation purposes.245 For other units, the 
process of promulgating a special regulation will help ensure thought-
ful, and possibly narrow, PWC authorizations that hopefully will miti-
gate possible damage.246 
3. Singling Out PWC Use Is Within NPS's Discretion 
Another likely attack on the PWC ban, also challenging the rea-
sonableness underlying the ban, may focus on NPS's decision to tar-
get only PWC and not other motorized watercraft.247 Adding fuel to 
this attack would be USCG's classification of PWC as Class A vessels, 
259 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,845 (1984) for reasonable 
accommodation test in situation of conflicting statutory mandates). 
24IlSeeid. 
241 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 49,316-
49,317 (1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). 
242 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. 
24S Seeid; 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. 
244 See Suuthern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. 
H5 See id.; 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. 
248 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1212; 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. 
247 See Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540, 544-
45 (D.C. Gir. 1995). 
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the same classification which applies to motorboats in general.248 
However, when the nature of USCG's Class A regulations and case law 
are considered, NPS's decision to single out PWC is not arbitrary and 
capricious.249 
The Organic Act mandates that NPS can regulate the waters of 
the System only in a manner consistent with the authority of the 
USCG to regulate waters of the United States.250 As discussed earlier, 
the purpose of NPS's regulatory powers over water is to protect natu-
ral, wildlife, cultural, and historical resources.251 USCG retains clear 
authority over issues such as boat design, safety, numbering, vessel 
documentation, and inspection requirements.252 Since NPS's motiva-
tion in banning PWC is, in large part, an attempt to reverse and pre-
vent environmental problems, it does not conflict with USCG's 
authority to oversee the more physical and mechanical aspects of mo-
torboats or violate the Organic Act.25s 
The one reported federal case on point, Personal Watercraft Indus-
try Ass 'n u Department of Commerce, also confirms the reasonableness of 
NPS's proposed ban on PWC.254 In that case, the court embraced the 
established principle that agencies can address issues one step at a 
time so long as the remedy is reasonable.255 The same factors which 
made the distinction reasonable in Personal Watercraft Industry 
Ass'n---in particular, the smaller size and increased maneuverability of 
PWG--also make NPS's distinction reasonable.256 Additionally, the 
PWC ban was proposed more than three years after NOAA's prohibi-
tion was challenged unsuccessfully. IT it were reasonable to ban PWC 
when the activity was a "new phenomenon," then the NPS ban seems 
even more reasonable when, presumably, the agency has had three 
years to observe and confirm the destruction witnessed in areas such 
as the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary.257 
248 See 46 C.F.R. §§ 24.10-17 (1997). 
249 See Personal Watercraft Indus. &s'n, 48 F.3d at 544-45; see 46 C.F.R. §§ 25.25, 25.30; 
Everglades National Park Special Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,781, 58,783-58,784 (1994). 
250 See 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h) (1994). 
251 SeeH.R. REp. No. 94-1569, 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4290,4298-99. 
252 See ill. 
255 See 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h); H.R. REP. No. 94-1569 at 13. 
254 See 48 F.3d 540,544 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
2M See id. at 544 (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) for its 
statement that an agency does not have "to make progress on every front before it can 
make progress on any front."). 
256 See ill. at 545. 
257 See ill. at 546. 
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B. NPS Should Favor the special Regulation Alternative fqr Authorizing 
PWCUse 
As detailed earlier in this Comment, NPS provides two ways in 
which units can authorize PWC use.258 Generally, authorization occurs 
through a special regulation which requires notice in the Federal Reg-
ister and an opportunity for public comment.259 However, NPS ex-
empted thirteen units from this procedure, requiring only that they 
follow the locally-based procedures outlined in C.F.R chapter 36, sec-
tions 1.5 and 1.7.260 NPS's justification for this more relaxed proce-
dure is that these System units were all established for water-related 
recreation and are characterized by substantial motorized use.26! De-
spite this reasoning, however, the language of the regulations in ques-
tion, the exceptions clause of the Organic Act, and case law all suggest 
that NPS should exercise extreme caution in allowing System unit su-
perintendents to avoid a Federal Register rulemaking.262 There are 
also strong policy considerations that support such a rulemaking in-
stead of unilateral action on the part of System unit superintendents. 
1. Applicable Regulations Should Be Read Narrowly in PWC Context 
According to C.F.R chapter 36, section 1.5(a), System unit super-
intendents may only designate areas for a specific activity if such des-
ignation is "necessary" for the maintenance of certain conditions, in-
cluding equitable allocation and use of facilities or the avoidance of 
user conflicts.2ss "Necessary" does not suggest a balancing of user 
conflicts but implicitly requires a finding by superintendents that al-
lowing PWC use is the only way user conflicts can be avoided.2M 
The difficulty of making such a determination is compounded by 
the fact that as soon as a superintendent decides that PWC use is nec-
essary to avoid user conflicts, he or she triggers other conditions in 
section 1.5(a) that then make the prohibition of PWC use neces-
sary.265 Namely, in light of the high accident rate of PWC and the 
258 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 49,316-
49,317 (1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). 
259 Seeid. at 49,316. 
260Seeid. 
261 See id. at 49,313. 
262 See 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1994); Michigan United Conservation Clubsv. Lujan, 949 F.2d 
202 (6thCir.1991); 36C.F.R. § 1.5 (1998). 
263 See 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(a). 
264Seeid. 
263Seeid. 
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damage they cause to wildlife habitation and aquatic vegetation, the 
prohibition of PWC use would be necessary to maintain public health 
and safety, as well as to protect environmental and scenic values.266 
Even if such a literal translation of section 1.5(a) is not under-
taken, section 1.5 (b) also restricts superintendents in relying on these 
locally-based procedures to authorize PWC use.267 The degradation of 
water quality inflicted by PWC, the destruction of sea grass when PWC 
operate in shallow water, and the "flight" of wildlife caused by PWC 
can be viewed as examples of adverse effects on a System unit's natu-
ral values.268 Such adverse impacts require a Federal Register rulemak.-
ing.269 Also supporting a Federal Register rulemaking is the highly 
controversial nature of PWC use, as evidenced, in part, by the wide-
spread media coverage of NPS's proposed ban.27o 
2. A PWC Ban in Units Established for Water-Related Recreation Does 
Not Per Se Violate Specified System Units' Enabling Legislation 
NPS's contention that less demanding procedures are required 
for System units established for water-related recreation may not be 
sufficient to avoid a Federal Register rulemaking.271 First, the Organic 
Act directs that the System cannot be managed in derogation of NPS's 
preservation mandate unless "directly and specifically provided by 
Congress."272 Second, case law indicates that courts interpret the Or-
ganic Act's exceptions clause narrowly and literally.275 
Therefore, unless the enabling legislation of the thirteen units 
specifically provides for PWC use, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that NPS cannot use the exceptions clause to justify the less demand-
!66Seeid. 
267 Seeid. § 1.5(b). 
268 See 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(b); Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 
49,312,49,316-49,317 (1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 
1998). 
269 See 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(b). 
2'10 Seeid.; see, e.g., Sward Be Doyle, supra note 10, atA-22; Winegar, supra note 10, at E3. 
2'11 See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (1994); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 
202,207-08 (6th Cir. 1991). 
2'12 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 204; DAVID J. 
SIMON, OuR COMMON LANDs: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 77-78 (1988). 
2'15 See Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207-08 (reasoning System unit 
enabling legislation permitting hunting did not extend to trapping because the legislation 
in question and legislative histories did not mention trapping and, in other instances, 
Congress had explicitly provided for trapping); see also supra notes 89-92 and accompany-
ingtext. 
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ing designation procedures.274 At least three of the thirteen units 
named by NPs-Amistad National Recreation Area, Bighorn Canyon 
National Recreation Area and Padre Island National Seashore-do 
not specifically mention PWC use.275 In fact, the enabling legislation 
of Amistad and Padre Island do not even explicitly or impliedly 
authorize pleasure boating, an activity of which NPS could at least ar-
gue that PWC is a subset.276 IT the exceptions clause does not apply, 
then these System units are in the same position as the other System 
units and, like the other units, should only be permitted to authorize 
PWC use through Federal Register rulemakings. 
Even if broad language such as the purpose clause in Amistad's 
legislation stating the unit was established to "provide for public out-
door recreation use and enjoyment of the lands and waters ... " does 
trigger the Organic Act's exceptions clause, NPS would not automati-
cally be able to rely on it to permit less demanding authorization pro-
cedures.277 Another possible limitation on invoking the exceptions 
clause is the presence of multiple purposes in a System unit's enabling 
legislation.278 According to Bicycle Trails Counci~ if there is language in 
a System unit's enabling legislation that calls for the preservation or 
protection of natural resources or scenic beauty, such language pre-
vents a complete derogation of any interest other than recreational 
use.279 
Both Amistad and Bighorn Canyon's enabling legislation contain 
such language.280 This language should at least indicate to NPS that 
the preservation mandate of the Organic Act still applies.281 Given 
that the preservation mandate appears to be dominant and that NPS 
has a clear responsibility to manage System units uniformly, the Fed-
eral Register Rulemaking that occurs on a national level is a better 
choice than relying on locally-based procedures.282 
1'14 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 207-08. 
1'15 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459d-d-7, 46Offf-fff-2, 460t-t-3 (1994). 
1'16 See ill. §§ 459d-d-7, 46Offf-fff-2. 
277 See ill. §§ 460fff(a) (1); Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1460-61 (9th 
Cir.I996). 
278 See Bicycle Trails Counci4 82 F.3d at 1461. 
279 See ill. 
280 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 46Offf(a)(2), 460t(a), 460t-2(a). For example, Bighorn Canyon's 
enabling legislation leaves it to the Secretary of the Interior to provide "for conservation of 
scenic, scientific, historic, and other values contributing to public enjoyment." Id. § 46Ot-
2(a). 
251 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I. 
!8l! See ill. §§ I, la-I; Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 
(6th Cir. 1991); Bicycle Trails Counci4 82 F.3d at 1451-54; National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 
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3. Policy Considerations Support a Stricter Approach 
In addition to purely legal issues, there are also several policy rea-
sons why NPS should favor the stricter alternative for authorizing 
PWC use in System units. First, PWC are still a relatively new phe-
nomenon.28S As safety and environmental issues continue to surface 
and environmentalists and members of the general public voice con-
cerns about the vessels, an increasing number of cities, states, and Sys-
tem units are banning or severely restricting PWC use in their juris-
dictions.284 NPS's System-wide PWC ban represents a comprehensive 
solution to a far-reaching problem before irreparable harm occurs.285 
Application of the locally-based procedures would chip away at this 
comprehensive solution. It could also lead to overcrowding and sub-
stantial environmental degradation of System units that do allow PWC 
use.286 Such a concern was expressed by a Golden Gate National Rec-
reation Area official in explaining why unit officials decided to per-
manently ban PWC.287 
Second, the special regulation alternative is a better idea from a 
policy standpoint because the American public as a whole has a vested 
interest in the System and its uses.288 If authorization of PWC use oc-
curs through a special regulation, the proposed rule is published in 
the Federal Register, as NPS's proposed PWC ban was, and it is open 
to comment from all sectors of American society.289 In contrast, if lo-
cally-based procedures are used, a System unit superintendent is re-
quired only to prepare a written justification for his or her actions, to 
make the justification available to the public, and to notifY the "af-
F. Supp.903, 909-10 (D.D.C. 1986); H.R. REp. No. 91-1265 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.CA-N. 3785, 3785; MANTELL Be METZGER, supra note 33, at 13. 
!83 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 49,313 
(1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15,1998). 
284 See id. at 49,314. For example, Everglades National Park and the Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, consisting of representatives from Nevada and California, banned PWC 
from their respective jurisdictions. See id. 
!83 See id. at 49,313-49,314. 
286 See Sward Be Doyle, supra note 10. 
287 See id. (citing spokeswoman who said GGNRA acted in part because "there was the 
possibility that as other agencies put tighter controls on jet skis, their use would increase in 
the bay.,,). 
28S See 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1994); Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1451-54 
(9thCir. 1996); H.R. REP. No. 91-1265 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA-N. 3785, 3785. 
289 See Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,312, 49,313 
(1998) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 Be 3) (proposed Sept. 15, 1998). Since, theoreti-
cally, all Americans had the opportunity to comment on and then, if need be, challenge 
NPS's handling of PWC use, the PWIA's complaint that there was no public participation 
in the process is unfounded. See ill.; NatWnal Park Service Has Gone Too Far, supra note 10. 
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fected" public through the posting of signs or through local newspa-
pers.290 The Federal Register rulemaking is more consistent with 
Congress's insistence that the System units are part of an integrated, 
national system.291 It is also more consistent with the popular image of 
the System as America's "playgrounds," areas that belong to all 
Americans.292 
Finally, policy reasons support the special regulation alternative 
because of NPS's own statements when initially proposing the System-
wide ban.293 When NPS proposed outlawing PWC use in all System 
units, it stated that, as a general matter, it presumed that PWC use was 
inappropriate in most units of the System.294 In its background sec-
tion, NPS also estimated that PWC use had been observed in about 
thirty-two System units that allowed motorized boating.295 The result is 
that more than forty percent of the System units which are character-
ized by the most PWC use-and therefore are subject to the most 
har~e able to continue their use most easily.296 Such a result un-
dercuts the "conservative" approach taken by NPS.297 
The result is even more disturbing when the additional twelve 
units in which NPS has authorized the use of locally-based procedures 
for a two-year period are considered.298 For two years after the NPS 
PWC ban is finalized, seventy-eight percent of park units will be al-
lowed to continue PWC use if a superintendent believes it is war-
ranted.299 Although it may be within NPS's authority to invoke the lo-
cally-based procedures, and superintendents should have some 
flexibility in management practices because they are the most familiar 
with their units' circumstances and use patterns, NPS should still ex-
ercise caution in allowing the use of locally-based authorization pro-
cedures in the PWC context.3OO If it does not, the presumption of 
PWC inappropriateness will be whittled away.Ml 
290 See 36 C.FR §§ 1.5(3) (c), 1.7(a)(l) & (2) (1998). 
291 See 16 U.S.C. § la-I; Bicycle Trails Counci4 82 F.3d at 1451-54; HR REp. No. 91-1265 
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 3785, 3785. 
292 See Winks, supra note 13, at 585. 
295 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313-49,314. 
294 See id. at 49,314. 
295 See id. at 49,313. 
296 See id. at 49,313-49,314. 
297 See id. 
298 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. 
299 See id. 
300 See 36 C.F.R §§ 1.5, 1.7 (1998). 
501 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314. 
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CONCLUSION 
PWC pose significant safety and environmental hazards to boat-
ers, swimmers, wildlife, aquatic vegetation, and to water bodies them-
selves. W2 To date, most of these issues have been dealt with on an ad 
hoc basis at city and state levels. W3 In addition to state laws establish-
ing age limits and licensing requirements for PWC use, some states 
and agencies have banned or severely limited PWC from particular 
stretches of water.304 
The PWC ban, proposed by NPS in September, 1998, represents 
the first System-wide and comprehensive attempt to address the de-
struction caused by these recreational vessels. W5 The System-wide ban 
is both a legal and effective remedy. It reflects the preservationist 
mandate of the Organic Act, its amendments, and legislative history. 
It is also consistent with the Organic Act's directive that System units 
be managed as an integrated whole. 
To remain true to its assumption that PWC use is inappropriate 
for most System units, the thirteen units that can authorize use 
through locally-based procedures should rely on these procedures 
with extreme caution. In most cases, a Federal Register rulemaking 
-the default authorization process of the proposed rule-would 
seem to be the more appropriate option. The System-wide and per-
manent ban, coupled with a strict authorization procedure, effectively 
address increasing PWC use in the System while simultaneously sup-
porting and setting an example for cities and states grappling with 
similar issues. 
302 See, e.g., id. at 49,314-49,315; Carey, supra note 4, at 56. 
303 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,314. 
304 See grmerally Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 48 F.3d 
540 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,313. 
305 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,316. 
